With Iran remaining unresponsive to the 5+1 Working Groups initiative aimed at coaxing Iran to end its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 that requests by 31 August a report from the Director General of the IAEA primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development On August 31, it is highly unlikely that IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei will be able to report that Iran has complied with the terms of UNSC Res. 1696. Instead, Iran will push ahead with its nuclear program.

Iran has not accepted the 5+1 Working Groups proposal nor responded to it in a timely fashion, because it has found the initiatives incentives insufficiently attractive and its potential penalties of little consequence. As far as Irans leadership is concerned, the international community is powerless to hinder Irans nuclear destiny.

Its leaders also view Irans nuclear fuel cycle as a matter of historic national achievement. They see Irans joining the ranks of the worlds nuclear powers as a key to unlimited self-determination. Irans pro-Khamenei daily, Keyhan, which often speaks for Irans leadership, declared, The announcement of the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle carries three messages for the West. Firstly it proves that the language of threat and pressure is not instrumental for Iran. Secondly, it proves that Iranian scientists are so efficient that they can create extraordinary moments every minute, and finally the most important message was that Iran has joined the international atomic club.

Not surprisingly, Irans reaction to the Security Council resolution was both swift and decisive. Upon its adoption by a 14-1 vote, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared, If some think they can still speak with threatening language to the Iranian nation, they must know that they are badly mistaken. In language that Iran has employed repeatedly to rationalize its nuclear program, Iranian UN Ambassador Javad Zarif signaled Irans likely defiance of the Resolution. He asserted, Irans peaceful nuclear program poses no threat to international peace and security and therefore dealing with this issue in the Security Council is unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility.

Zarifs declaration that UNSC Res. 1696 is void of any legal basis opens a dangerous new avenue by which Iran will likely continue to repudiate calls to terminate its nuclear program. By asserting that the Resolution is void of any legal basis, Zarif attacked not the terms of the Resolution, but the authority of the UN Security Council itself. Only if the UN Security Council lacks authority can its resolutions be void of any legal basis. Otherwise, Zarif would have described the Resolution as unwarranted, unnecessary or even unjust. Instead, eager to erase any ambiguity in Irans position, Zarif set forth the rules by which Iran seeks to deal with the controversy over its nuclear program: Neither the IAEA nor the United Nations has any authority to rein in Irans nuclear program. Iran will likely use that line of argument to resist future additional calls or demands by the international community to cease its nuclear program.

Iran is now building the legal framework for its future defiance, because it has calculated that the world community is not able or willing to thwart its nuclear program. To date, it has succeeded in maintaining its nuclear activities with little consequence. Furthermore, it does not expect this situation to change anytime soon, as it has been underwhelmed by the kind of sanctions that might conceivably come under consideration.

UNSC Res. 1696 warns that in the event that Iran has notcomplied with this resolution that the Security Council would adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Article 41 states, The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Based on the Security Councils having softened the language of the UNSC Res. 1696 prior to its adoption, it is highly unlikely that any of the Article 41 measures would prove more severe than the sanctions previously outlined in the 5+1 Working Groups proposal. Even before such sanctions would be implemented, further decisions will be required by the Security Council. New debate would mean new possibilities for division and, as happened in the drafting of UNSC Res. 1696, a weakening of any potential punitive measures could well take place. In short, for Iran, the costs of defiance remain very low relative to the benefits it believes it can attain from completing its nuclear objectives.

Not one provision in the 5+1 Working Groups plan would curb Irans ability to sell oil in the world market. Yet, that is about the only penalty that would inflict meaningful pain on Irans economy and government, as oil sales account for 80%-90% of Irans export revenue and they finance 40%-50% of Irans federal budget. Curbs on international investment in Irans nuclear energy program are also essentially meaningless. Rising oil revenue would provide Iran with an ocean of petrodollars that would thwart the effectiveness of any such measures.

Finally rather than being persuaded by UNSC Res. 1696 to accommodate the worlds concerns over its nuclear program, it appears that Iran has decided to make that Resolution a test, of its assumption that its completion of the nuclear fuel cycle has made Iran immune to such international pressure. Some powers want to have a monopoly. For over three years, they have acted in a political and monopolistic way, and created problems and obstacles regarding Irans nuclear case, Ahmadinejad complained. We have a long road ahead in battling the rule of hegemony, he added.

Ahmadinejad likely believes that only the development of nuclear weapons could make it possible for Iran to break the rule of hegemony about which he complains. If so, the proverbial lines in the sand are clearly drawn. So long as Iran can maintain its pursuit of nuclear weapons with little to lose, it will be full steam ahead for the Iranians. Neither the new UN resolution nor the 5+1 Working Groups package will change this. Iran believes it has broken free to the point of no return and is now free to complete is nuclear journey.

If Irans calculations prove correct, the aftermath could have lasting adverse global consequences. In an op-ed published in the July 31, 2006 issue of The Washington Post, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that if a deadlock between strained forbearance by the Six [Russia, China, France, Britain, Germany, and the United States] and taunting invective from the Iranian president leads to de facto acquiescence in the Iranian nuclear program, prospects for multilateral international order will dim everywhere. In that context, August 31 could prove a watershed date. Recent statements from its diplomats indicate that Iran has made its move to defy the will of the United Nations Security Council. Now, it remains to be seen whether the international community will be able to counter that bold gambit.